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Abstract
Lead acid batteries generate hazardous waste in the form of lead, 
with serious environmental and health implications. These batteries 
are recyclable and the present Deposit Refund System for recycling 
operating in Delhi provides a discount to consumers when they 
purchase a new battery and return used batteries to retailers. The 
retailers in turn determine whether the batteries will be recycled 
in an environment-friendly or unfriendly manner by selling them to 
manufacturers or informal sector scrap dealers, who then sell them 
to un-registered smelters. This study finds that that the economic 
instrument that brings used batteries into the recycling system works 
exceptionally well. However, organized lead recycling is undertaken 
only in a limited manner. Rather, retailers prefer to sell used batteries 
to the informal sector because they obtain higher prices, and incur 
lower storage costs and taxes. Current rules prevent scrap dealers 
from selling batteries to regulated smelters. Relaxing these rules 
would reduce raw material shortfalls currently experienced by the 
sector and bring more batteries into the formal recycling market. In 
addition, an alternate policy instrument to consider is a green tax 
on batteries coupled with a partial or complete refund when the 
manufacturer ensures environment-friendly recycling.
Key Words: lead battery, recycling, deposit refund systems, extended 
producer responsibility, green tax
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1. Introduction
About 80% of the lead produced worldwide is used in the manufacture of automotive lead acid batteries  
(Kreusch et al., 2007). India is one of the fastest growing markets for passenger cars and the world’s second largest 
manufacturer of two wheelers. It holds the distinction of being the largest manufacturer of motorcycles and the fifth 
largest manufacturer of commercial vehicles. Thus, the demand and use of lead in India is expected to significantly 
expand in the coming years. The industry manufacturing lead-acid batteries (automotive as well as other) in India is 
currently growing at a rate of over 20% per annum (EIL, 2009), and is heavily dependent on lead, which constitutes 
50% of the operational cost of producing a battery (Das, 2009).
Lead acid batteries have a life of three to four years. This contributes to an almost un-noticed but serious 
environmental problem of hazardous waste.1 Lead is a highly toxic metal and is considered one of the 17 most 
dangerous chemicals in terms of the threat it poses to human beings and the environment by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (Wu et al., 2004). Lead can cause behavioral problems and learning disabilities and can be fatal 
to children who inhale or ingest it. Lead poisoning can lead to impaired physical growth, kidney damage, retardation, 
and in extreme cases even death. Birth defects like cardiovascular defects, oral clefts and musculoskeletal 
anomalies diagnosed in newborns are also associated with lead exposure (Vinceti et al. 2001). Furthermore, lead 
can also be toxic to plants, diminishing their productivity or biomass, and eliminating some species (Singh, et al., 
1997; Xiong, 1997; Patra et al., 2004).
Globally, recycled lead is an important source of lead, which offers both a solution and challenges to the health 
hazards posed by this mineral. Demand for lead is met from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources 
constitute lead ores extracted from mines, whereas secondary sources of lead are smelters who recycle lead from 
lead scrap. The scrap mainly comprises of used lead-acid batteries, old lead pipes and cables. Lead acid batteries 
are among the most recyclable products in the world with a reported collection and recovery rate of 96% in the 
US during 2004 to 2008 (Battery Council International, 2009) and 85% in Western Europe (Bied-Charreton, 1993). 
Used lead acid batteries (all types) with an average 10.5 kg of lead (Smith, 1999) serve as a source of raw material 
required for battery manufacturing. High rates of recycling are achieved in the countries where there is legislation 
governing the collection and recycling of lead-acid batteries. In poorer economies such as Egypt and India, very 
high rates of recycling are found but not reported because a large quantity of lead is recycled informally (Roberts, 
2003). The informal sector in lead recycling can be extremely hazardous, particularly for workers.
Lead recycling is often supported through a well-functioning Deposit Refund System (DRS) in the market for 
batteries (branded and generic). In this system, people can get a discount on the purchase of a new battery if they 
return the used one to the retailer. Peter Bohm (1981) describes this as an arrangement between consumers and 
producers where a refund is provided even without taking a deposit. While a DRS has existed in the Indian battery 
markets for a long time, in 2001 the Indian Government put in place a set of rules to regulate the recycled lead 
market. These rules stipulate where and how lead is supposed to be recycled and have supported the development 
of a market for recycled lead through a DRS for batteries.
Since a legal framework for using recycled lead batteries has been in place in India for over ten years, it is important 
to assess how effective the regulations have been in terms of recycling and disposal of lead-acid batteries. Thus, 
the objectives of this study are to: a) understand the strengths and weaknesses of the current DRS in order to 
1 Lead acid batteries are classified as a hazardous waste under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
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ensure better recycling of lead-acid batteries; and b) identify policy instruments that could complement the existing 
system. We do this by studying the roles of and incentives faced by major stakeholders in both the organized and 
unorganized battery recycling sectors. 
The rest of this paper has the following structure: section two discusses the deposit refund system and extended 
producer responsibility in the context of battery recycling in India. The third and fourth sections describe the data 
and methodology used in this study. Sections five and six discuss results and alternative policy instruments to 
complement the DRS. The conclusion with policy recommendations forms the last section.
2.  The Deposit Refund Scheme and Battery Recycling in the National 
Capital Region
While small-scale industries are very valuable for sustainable development, they can create problems when they 
generate high levels of pollution (Dasgupta et al., 1998). This is the case with lead acid batteries in India, which are 
recycled mainly by small scale smelting units operating in the organized as well as unorganized sectors. 
The lead acid battery recycling industry in India lacked any kind of regulation till 2001. In the absence of proper 
smelting facilities and legislation, a large number of backyard smelting units and recyclers operated in India (and 
some still continue to operate). These backyard smelters recover lead from batteries in a crude manner, causing 
lead pollution in surrounding areas and affecting the health of the workers. Rao et al. (2007), estimate that nearly 
11.35 kg of lead are released to the environment from the production of 1000 batteries. Recycling of battery scrap 
can cause environmental problems through the emission of dust containing lead particulates and sulphur oxides 
(Valdez, 1997). 
In battery manufacturing plants, lead exposure to workers is a major occupational hazard (Yamin, 2007). Poor 
hygiene, inappropriate protection and lack of awareness increase the risk of lead poisoning. Most workers are 
ignorant of the ill effects of lead and do not take precautions such as wearing masks, gloves and safety glasses 
while handling lead. They also indulge in practices like eating, smoking and sleeping in the same premises, resulting 
in accumulation of dangerously high blood lead levels (Herman et al. 2007). In India, Rao et al. (2007), for instance, 
found that the average blood lead levels of battery workers were significantly higher than those of control groups. 
Hsiao et al. (2001), in another study in Taiwan, found that long-term exposure to lead among lead battery factory 
workers resulted in high levels of lead in their bones even after devices to reduce exposure were installed. The 
occupational hazards resulting from lead battery recycling in the un-organized sector was a motivating factor for 
India to formulate stronger regulations.
In 2001, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) of the Government of India (GoI) came up with ‘The 
Batteries (Management and Handling) Rules, 2001’ (BMHR), henceforth referred to as the “Rules”, which require 
retailers to sell the used batteries to registered smelters who are required to use technologies that do not have 
a harmful impact on the environment. It further stipulates that battery manufacturers must collect (through the 
DRS or buy-back system) at least 90% of new batteries sold for organized smelting/recycling. The legal framework 
requires manufacturers and importers of batteries to be involved in the buy-back system either directly or indirectly. 
By doing this, the BMHR, 2001 have (without explicitly naming it) laid down the legal framework for “Extended 
Producer Responsibility” (EPR) in this industry. EPR is an environmental protection strategy that makes the 
manufacturer of a product responsible for the entire life-cycle of the product (Lindqvist, 2000).
A well-functioning DRS exists in the market for lead acid batteries in Delhi and the National Capital Region (NCR). 
The battery recycling industry in Delhi and NCR includes consumers, battery manufacturers, retailers, registered or 
organized smelters, scrap dealers and unorganized or backyard smelters called “bhattis.”
BMHR (2001) requires retailers to sell the batteries collected through the DRS back to manufacturers or registered 
lead smelters to prevent them from reaching the unorganized or back yard smelters. This is a variant of a typical 
DRS in which consumers make deposits that are added to the price of a product and receive refunds when 
they return used products (Bohm, 1981). The DRS facilitates consumers of lead acid batteries (excluding bulk 
consumers such as the railways, the defense establishment and large industrial houses) with a discount on the 
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purchase of new batteries on the return of used lead acid batteries to retailers (without any prior deposit made by 
them). The discount given by the retailers is determined by the market price of lead at the London Metal Exchange.2
Once consumers return used batteries to retailers, the recycling of these batteries is carried out through two modes 
(see Figure 2). The first mode complies with the Rules and involves retailers selling used batteries returned by the 
consumers to the manufacturers. As shown in Figure 2, a used battery goes from the consumer to the retailer and 
then to the manufacturer or organized smelter. The second pathway is of non-compliance with the Rules, which 
involves retailers selling the used batteries to scrap dealers, who then sell them further to the unorganized smelters 
or “bhattis.”
Lead smelters are not legally allowed to operate in the city of Delhi. While registered smelters are located in 
industrial areas in the NCR, unregistered smelters operate from remote agricultural and other areas in the outskirts 
of the city. An informal sector smelter is able to extract lead worth approximately Rs. 515 from an average car 
battery (as shown in Figure 3). These unorganized smelters sell the secondary lead (ingots/”silli”) they produce to 
local battery manufacturers or scrap dealers.
3. Study Area & Data
This study was conducted in the National Capital Region (NCR) of Delhi with an area of 1483 square kilometers. The 
data for the study comes from questionnaire based surveys and unstructured interviews carried out in 2010. 
A retailer survey was conducted to identify the factors that affect the decision of retailers to sell batteries to 
manufacturers or scrap dealers. To survey the retailers, we first undertook a pilot survey of some retailers. Then, 
we created a sampling frame of 150 retailers located in the commercial and residential areas of North, South, 
East, West, Central Delhi and NCR (Vaishali and Gurgaon) using information from the “Battery Year Book-2005”, a 
directory of battery retailers. Finally 96 retailers were surveyed by randomly identifying markets that had a cluster 
(more than two) of battery retailers.3 Twenty-eight percent of the sample was located in South Delhi, twenty-two, 
seventeen, fourteen, 12% and 7% in East, West, Central Delhi and NCR respectively (see Figure 4).We obtained 
information on issues such as their status (authorized or not); awareness of the Rules; how many used batteries 
they bought back every week; who they sold the used batteries to; discount given on new batteries; selling price of 
used batteries; frequency of battery collection by manufacturer and scrap dealer and their location.
We found that 44% of the retailers surveyed were ‘authorized’ to sell certain brands and sold only those, 17% were 
not authorized and 35% sold multiple brands of which they were authorized to sell some. The majority (65%) of the 
retailers were aware of the Rules. Fifty-four percent of the retailers were located in residential areas. Only 26% of 
the retailers admitted to complying with the Rules and selling the used batteries to the manufacturers. Sixty percent 
sold to scrap dealers and about 13% sold to both manufacturer and scrap dealers.
Simultaneously, another questionnaire was prepared to assess the level of awareness and participation of 
consumers in the deposit refund system. We divided the city of Delhi and NCR into 6 zones: North, South, East, 
West, Central and NCR. From within these zones, we administered the questionnaire to 106 households that owned 
cars using convenience sampling. Seventy percent of these households were located in Delhi and 30% in the NCR. 
This survey was undertaken in January and February 2010. 
In order to understand how the formal sector operates, we undertook a case study of Exide India Limited, one of 
few battery manufacturers in India with a recycling business for batteries. We obtained data on Exide’s recycling 
unit—Chloride Metals. Data was obtained from annual reports and interviews with senior officials of Exide using a 
structured questionnaire.
Information from other organized smelters, unorganized smelters and scrap dealers was collected through 
unstructured interviews. The informal sector stakeholders like scrap dealers and smelters were reluctant to share 
2 The price of lead (primary lead from mines and secondary lead from recycling of the used batteries) depends on the market price guided by 
the London Metal Exchange (LME). Figure 1 shows the trend of lead price (US$/Ton) of the last five years from Jan 2005 to December 2010 
(LME). Variation in the price of lead at LME has a direct impact on the price of the new and used batteries and recycling scrap. 
3  We chose this method of sampling because some of the shops mentioned in the directory had either shut down or had moved away.
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any information as their operation is primarily illegal. Small lead smelters in the organized sector were also unwilling 
to share any financial information. Thus, we used unstructured interviews to understand their role, incentives and 
the socio-economic and health impacts in the lead recycling industry. We undertook interviews with five organized 
smelters in addition to Chloride Metals. The unorganized smelters or “Bhattis” located in Mandoli and Ghaziabad, 
close to the eastern border of Delhi were interviewed to understand their mode of operation, availability of raw 
materials, cost and profitability of their business and problems including health concerns faced by the workers. We 
visited these Bhattis for seven days and had interviewed ten operators.
4. Methodology
The entire chain of recycling depends on the retailers’ choice to sell the used batteries either back to the 
manufacturer (which results in recycling through the organized sector) or to scrap dealers (which results in recycling 
through the unorganized sector). As Figure 5 shows, the retailer acts as the interface between the consumer and 
the manufacturer and recycler of batteries. Local and branded battery manufacturers sell their product through 
retailers. Once a retailer receives a used battery it gets recycled either by registered smelters or unorganized 
smelters/ “bhattis”. The recycled lead reaches both types of manufacturers. We also found evidence that indicates 
some movement of used batteries from scrap dealers to registered smelters.
4.1 Examining Consumer and Retailer Decision-making
The first question of interest to us was the extent to which consumers are willing to sell batteries back to retailers. 
They have a choice of selling batteries to scrap dealers directly, thus, we probed this issue through surveys and 
report some simple evidence of very high levels of awareness and participation in the buy-back system (DRS).
The second issue of interest is how retailers are making their decisions to sell batteries to the organized or un-
organized sector. To address this question, we undertook an econometric analysis of retailers’ sales decisions. 
Retailers face a dichotomous choice of who to sell the used batteries to – they can either sell it to manufacturers or 
to scrap dealers. The dependent variable (Y) “comply” takes on a value of one when retailers sell used batteries only 
to the manufacturer (compliance with BMHR) and zero otherwise. 
Equation 1 presents a logistic regression model used to analyze the responses from the retailers:
P = Probability (Y=1| X1 = x1, X2 = x2––)  = ln [π/ (1−π)] 
 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + _ _ _ + βpXp         (1)
Where π is the probability of the event i.e. of the retailer complying with BMHR and selling to manufacturers, β0 is 
the intercept, βp are regression coefficients and Xp are a set of predictors that influence the retailer’s decision. Y is 
the decision of retailers to sell batteries only to the manufacturer or not only to manufacturer (to scrap dealers or 
scrap dealers and manufacturers). 
An important factor that affects compliance is the location of the retailers (location). This variable takes on the 
value 0 when location is in a residential area and the value 1 when the location is in a commercial area. We 
hypothesize that retailers located in commercial areas are more likely to comply. Therefore this variable is expected 
to have a positive sign in the regression model.
The type of retailer (type) also matters. We identified three types of retailers: authorized, general and both. 
Authorized retailers are those who are authorized to sell certain brands and general retailers are those that sell only 
un-branded batteries. Some retailers sold authorized brands and also unauthorized brands – such retailers were 
clubbed with the authorized retailers. Thus, the variable type takes the value 0 if the retailer is selling any branded 
batteries and 1 if he only sells un-branded batteries. A manufacturer is not likely to visit and collect used batteries 
from a retailer who sells only un-branded batteries, therefore, this variable is expected to have a negative sign. 
Awareness about BMHR, 2001 (awareness) is a dummy variable and takes on a value of 1 when retailers are 
aware of BMHR and 0 otherwise. Since awareness is expected to increase compliance, this variable should have a 
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positive sign in the regression model. The number of used batteries bought back for every 100 batteries sold per 
week (bought back) is a variable that allows us to understand the scale of the retailer’s operations. To answer this 
question, retailers were asked to identify percent of batteries bought back by choosing from among various options: 
51-60%, 61-70%, 71-80%, 81-90% and 91-100%. The percent of batteries bought back for every 100 batteries sold 
was calculated by taking the mid-point of these options. We hypothesize that the higher the percentage of batteries 
bought back each week, the less likely it is for retailers to comply because of high storage costs (so the variable 
should have a negative sign).
We have information on two price variables. The price paid by retailers for used batteries is the buy-back price. 
Retailers were asked about the price (buy-back price) which they paid to consumers for used batteries and the price 
(selling price) they obtained from manufacturers or scrap dealers for used batteries. Since most responses were in 
terms of a range of prices, the mid-point was taken. The difference between the buy-back price and selling price is 
called profit and is hypothesized to have a negative effect on the probability of selling batteries to manufacturers. 
We also created a ratio of selling prices to the buy-back prices (price ratio). Both these variables are expected to 
have a negative impact on compliance and are expected to have a negative sign.
The frequency of visits from scrap dealers and manufacturers to collect used batteries is important because 
retailers find it difficult to store bulky batteries. Two variables reflect frequency of visits by the manufacturer 
(manufacturer visit) and by scrap dealers (scrap visit). These refer to the number of days per month that the 
manufacturer/scrap dealer visited retailers to collect used batteries. The frequency of collection visits by the 
manufacturer is hypothesized to increase the probability of compliance (positive sign), while the frequency of 
collection visits by scrap dealers is hypothesized to have an opposite effect (negative sign). 
There are two explanatory variables that are of interest from a policy perspective: awareness and manufacturer 
visit. The higher the level of awareness of the Rules and the greater the frequency of manufacturer visits per month, 
the higher is the probability of compliance. The remaining explanatory variables discussed above act as control 
variables. 
4.2 Incentives Faced by the Un-organized and Organized battery recycling sectors
To better understand the incentives facing the un-organized sector we used qualitative information obtained from 
scrap dealers and smelters. It is important to understand the costs of compliance to those in the un-organized 
sector. Thus, we estimated the costs of setting up a plant in an industrial zone and running a smelting unit (including 
taxes) and the additional cost incurred on compliance in accordance with the requirements of the pollution control 
authority (pollution control equipment and its maintenance). Information from the un-organized sector on wages, 
number of employees, number of days worked etc. were used to estimate the cost to society if compliance for this 
sector meant shutting down of operations
A final set of issues that we analyzed was the incentives facing the organized sector. An important issue to establish 
is whether it is profitable for the formal sector to recycle batteries. To understand the economic viability of this 
business, we did a case study of Exide’s recycling unit—Chloride Metals. In this case study, we calculated the 
NPV and IRR of operating the unit. Data from Chloride Metals Limited was used to establish financial viability of 
organized smelting.
5.  Results and Discussion
5.1 Consumers and the DRS
The results of the consumer survey revealed that 88% of the respondents were well aware of the deposit refund 
system and 90% of them returned their used battery back to the retailers irrespective of the discount price. The 
difference in these numbers could be because the deposit-refund system is so well established in the market for 
lead-acid batteries that some people return/recycle used batteries without even realizing it. The survey results also 
show that the average consumer in our study was aware of the DRS and about 95% consumers preferred to buy 
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a branded battery. Consumers sold used batteries back to retailers and received on average about Rs. 372 (this 
number ranged from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500) for a used battery. This discount is available only when a new battery is 
purchased and covers approximately 9% of the cost of a new battery.
5.2  The Retailers’ Decision to Comply 
A logistic regression was used to analyze the responses from retailers. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the 
dependent and the independent variables. On average, a retailer is able to buy back 69 used batteries for every 100 
batteries sold in a week. Table 1 indicates that on average the manufacturer’s representatives collect used batteries 
twice a month, while scrap dealers collect used batteries on average every 10 days per month. The mean price 
retailers pay for buying back used batteries is Rs. 416 while the mean price retailers get for these batteries is about 
Rs. 456.4 Retailers obtain 0.9% higher price when they sell to scrap dealers instead of manufacturers (as shown in 
Figures 2 and 3).
Results of the logit estimation of the compliance decision of retailers are presented in Table 2. The models 
estimated were tested for multicollinearity and model specification. The results of these tests showed neither 
multicollinearity nor any model misspecification. The signs and significance of the variables in the models I and II 
are the same. All variables are significant at least at the 5% level of significance except manufacturer visit. This may 
be because this variable has very little variation with a mean of 2, standard deviation of 5.38.
As expected, awareness of the BMHR rules and being located in a commercial area, have a positive impact on the 
probability of selling only to the manufacturer. The variables type, scrap visit and bought back have negative signs. 
This shows that being a general battery retailer (as compared to an authorized one), the higher the number of scrap 
dealer visits in a month, and the larger the percentage of used batteries bought back have a negative effect on the 
probability of selling used batteries only to the manufacturer. This makes sense because the manufacturer is not 
likely to visit a ‘general’ retailer (who sells only un-branded batteries) to collect battery scrap. Storing used batteries 
has a cost associated with it, so retailers would be more inclined to reduce this cost by selling to scrap dealers if 
they come to collect often. How many batteries they have to store would also depend on how many they buy back.
Several retailers told us that the scrap dealers pay more for used batteries.5 The coefficient of profit is significant 
and has a negative sign (in model I), showing that the higher the profit earned by recycling the less likely it is for 
retailers to sell the used batteries to manufacturers. In model II, the coefficient of the price ratio is significant with 
a negative sign indicating again that as the ratio of selling price to buying price of battery scrap increases, it is less 
likely for this scrap to be sold to manufacturers.
5.3  The Unorganized Battery Recycling Sector
Lack of awareness, illiteracy, complexity of paper work, restrictions on location, maintenance of pollution control 
equipment and reluctance to pay taxes keeps the unorganized smelters from getting their units registered and 
complying with BMHR. There are about 70 unorganized smelters operating in the outskirts of Delhi but in the NCR 
(40 in Mandoli and 30 in Ghaziabad) with about 840 employees.
Interviews with the organized and unorganized smelters revealed that at present both types use the same pollution 
control technology – bag-house filters, which collect the ash from the flue. Ash has a high content of lead. Almost 
50% of the recycled lead obtained from the used batteries comes from this ash. The recovery of ash controls air 
pollution since if not recovered through bag-house filters, the ash and the lead within it, would simply linger in the 
air. Further, it is also a source of profit for smelters as lead ash is valued at about Rs. 2/- per kg. This is an incentive 
for all unorganized smelters to install the bag–house filter technology. But, as we observed, the filter equipment 
used was crude, badly maintained and prone to leakage and thus posed a threat to the environment and health of 
the workers. 
4 A paired t-test shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the mean buy-back price and mean selling price at the 
1% level of significance
5 Scrap dealers buy back used batteries based on their lead content. The price of lead is determined by the daily price of lead on the LME. 
The scrap dealers may therefore be able to pass on large daily variations in the price of lead which manufacturers may not because of a 
fixed price that is changed periodically.
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Unorganized smelting units are of similar capacity and employ 3 - 4 workers (1 “mistry” or the main worker and 
two or three helpers) to run the bhatti in each shift. These units run in three consecutive shifts every day as they 
have sufficient raw material. In addition they also employ 8 to 10 laborers on a contract/daily wage basis (mostly 
women) to break the batteries. Each smelting unit has a pool of about 100 workers hailing from villages in Varanasi 
district of Uttar Pradesh.
Most workers in unorganized smelting units live on the premises. The workers are usually employed for a period of 
two to three months at a stretch. They develop health problems after that and quit or are forced to go back to their 
villages. The typical symptoms of indigestion, abdominal pain and severe constipation are treated by local doctors. 
Very few workers are taken to hospitals because the smelters are not willing to disclose their occupation. 
Workers earn about three thousand rupees a month. Some of them return to work on call while most do not and 
continue with other jobs in their villages. Those with no other employment options return to these smelters on call 
once they have recovered. These workers stand to lose about 30,000 rupees annually because they fall sick and 
cannot continue working in the smelting units. (If we assume that they have no other employment.) Sometimes 
the smelters pay the workers in advance while they are recovering at home to prevent them from moving to other 
smelting units.
Unorganized smelters face no shortage of raw material as scrap dealers provide them with a constant supply of 
used batteries. Extracted lead ingots or “silli”, are either sold to units that manufacture lead oxide, cables and 
generic batteries (usually co-located with the smelters) or to scrap dealers and secondary lead dealers in Delhi. 
The difference in the price at which smelters buy lead (in the form of batteries) and sell it is, on average, Rs 5/kg of 
lead. The smelters also perform “job work” for retailers in Delhi who send used batteries to them and buy back the 
extracted lead. The hard poly- propylene plastic cover of the batteries is sold to plastic recyclers.
A scrap dealer serves as the middle-man who collects used batteries from battery retailers and sells them to the 
unorganized smelters at a profit margin of Rs. 1.50 per kg of lead in the battery. This is mostly paid in secondary 
lead. The scrap dealers then sell this secondary lead to small battery manufacturers. Some scrap dealers we 
interviewed felt that their business had been adversely affected by the recent decision made by some bulk battery 
consumers to float tenders to sell battery scrap instead of holding open auctions. A few claimed to sell battery 
scrap only to registered smelters. All the registered smelters we spoke to insisted that they bought used batteries 
only from bulk consumers through auction or tenders (implying compliance with BMHR) and not from scrap dealers.
An average scrap dealer collects about two tons of used batteries (both branded and generic batteries) every day. 
This would give the scrap dealer revenue of about Rs. 1800 per day (at Rs. 1.50 per kg of lead). The scrap dealers 
reported that retailers prefer to sell the used batteries to them because the manufacturer’s representatives visit 
them infrequently or their collection centers are located at long distances and because they have to buy new 
batteries in lieu of the ones returned. As a result, the majority of the used batteries recycled under the present DRS 
find their way to informal smelters through scrap dealers. The results of our retailer survey substantiate this claim 
because 60% of retailers reported that they sold used batteries to scrap dealers and 13% said they sold to both 
scrap dealers and manufacturers. Only 27% sold only to manufacturers.
5.4 The Organized Battery Recycling Sector
Organized smelters acquire the battery scrap through government auctions (Railways, Defense etc.) and 
also from the import of lead scrap (under license from the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF)). The 
capacity utilization of organized smelters is low because of a limited supply of battery scrap. The installation and 
maintenance of pollution control equipment (other than bag filters) together with applicable taxes (as shown in Table 
3) and transportation costs6 add to the cost of running the smelting units. This additional cost can be considered 
the compliance cost for the organized smelters. 
6 According to an order of the Delhi High Court all registered smelters have to be located beyond a radius of 60km from Delhi. The terms of 
the auctions require the buyer to arrange for the transport of raw materials from the auction site to their units within the stipulated time.
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The BMHR require battery manufacturers to be involved directly or indirectly in the buy-back of used batteries and 
ensure that they are smelted by registered smelters with environment-friendly technology. The financial information 
on the smelting operations of Chloride Metals Limited (CML), one of Exide’s smelters, is shown in table 4 for the 
year 2008-09. Exide acquired CML at an initial cost of Rs. 43 crores with an installed capacity of smelting 36,000 
tons. CML smelted 16,707 tons of lead (8,441 tons from used batteries and 8,508 tons from other sources) 
during 2008-09. The operating cost of the unit included cost of energy, labor, occupational health and safety and 
maintenance. Revenue earned was from sale of recycled lead, job work and sale of bye products. Analyses of input 
costs and output revenues (Table 4) show that the smelting unit has an NPV of Rs. 96.05 crores and Rs. 87.47 
crores at 8% and 10% discount rates respectively. As the NPV is positive, running the smelting unit is economically 
viable. Therefore, at this capacity of operation, the market provides a battery manufacturer with adequate economic 
incentive to comply with the BMHR.
5.5 Cost of Complying with BMHR (2001)
The stakeholders in the organized sector of lead recycling incur a cost of complying with BMHR. We discuss the 
costs of compliance to each of the different stakeholders in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, consumers get a discount (Rs. 372) on a new battery when they return a used battery to the 
retailer. So compliance with BMHR gives them a net benefit of Rs. 44 per kg of recycled lead.
If battery retailers sell all used batteries to the manufacturer (assuming that they don’t sell directly to organized 
smelters) they would be complying with the BMHR. Assuming that the manufacturers’ representatives visit all 
retailers to collect the battery scrap, the retailers would incur a cost of storing the battery till it is collected, the 
opportunity cost of not selling it to a scrap dealer plus the taxes applicable on sales. The retailers we surveyed were 
unable to quantify the cost of storage. The average price a scrap dealer pays for a battery is about 459 rupees, 
while a manufacturer’s representative pays about 455 rupees. So the compliance cost (excluding storage cost and 
taxes) incurred by an average retailer who buys back sixty-nine batteries in a week would be the difference in the 
two prices, i.e. Rs. 4 per battery or approximately Rs. 0.50 per kg week (or Rs. 500 per ton of recycled lead). This 
is a very small amount and indicates that the main incentive to sell to scrap dealers comes from significant storage 
costs and taxes. 
For organized smelters, the costs of compliance include installation and maintenance of pollution control 
equipment (other than bag filters), taxes on purchase of battery scrap, and transportation costs. Table 3 gives an 
illustrative estimate of costs associated with setting up and running a smelting unit of 5000 MT capacity in the Delhi 
region based on interviews with organized smelters for illustrative purposes.
The market provides a battery manufacturer with adequate economic incentive to comply with the BMHR 
(see section 5.4). The main issue is more of coordination. If manufacturers accept their “extended producer 
responsibility” and join the battery buy back process and ensure more frequent collection from authorized and 
other retailers, they will be able to capture a larger share of battery scrap. The costs associated with this process 
are likely to be small. 
The stakeholders in the un-organized sector do not comply with the BMHR so they do not incur a cost of 
compliance. If scrap dealers were to comply in the current scenario by selling the battery scrap to manufacturers, 
they would incur a loss of Rs. 4 per battery (since scrap dealers pay Rs. 459 per battery to retailers and 
manufacturers pay Rs. 455). This would mean that the scrap dealers would go out of business. 
Since the smelters in this sector do not feel the need to adopt better technology and get registered with the 
pollution control authorities, compliance would imply that their operations are shut down. The cost to society of 
closing these units would be in terms of about 840 workers losing their jobs around Delhi and NCR. If they did 
choose to comply, their compliance cost would be reflected by the costs estimates shown in table 3. The cost of 
compliance is high for these stakeholders.
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6. Policy Options for Safe Disposal of Used Batteries
The current deposit refund instrument is unable to discourage unorganized smelting of used batteries in Delhi. Non-
compliance with BMHR happens because of: a) costs borne by retailers if they sell only to the organized sector; b) 
profit incentives for the unorganized smelters to use inefficient technologies; c) coordination problems that limit 
the amount and frequency of collection and recycling that is done by the organized sector; and d) inability of the 
regulator to fully monitor the market for recycled lead. Based on this analysis, we identify several policy options in 
Table 6.
One policy option would be to impose a penalty on battery manufacturers and importers for non-compliance. 
This would ensure that all used batteries manufactured in this sector are collected and recycled/disposed safely. 
However, the impact of this policy would depend on the magnitude of the penalty and would be limited because 
of the presence of a large unorganized sector in the battery manufacturing industry.7 Monitoring agencies are 
understaffed and will be unable to monitor all units. Imposing penalties for non-compliance on all organized sector 
stakeholders is likely to have a good impact. However, this would also prove costly to implement.
Another policy option would be to impose a non-compliance penalty on retailers to make them sell all the used 
batteries to manufacturers or organized smelters. The inability to monitor the large number of retailers in this 
market would limit the impact of this policy.8
A green tax per battery produced on manufacturers and a subsidy for a battery properly disposed (disposed 
by organized smelting) in combination with the current deposit refunding to users of batteries could ensure 
the manufacturer complies with extended producer responsibility. Since it is the lead used in making batteries 
that causes the environmental problem, alternatively there could be a tax on lead used and a subsidy on lead 
recovered by the manufacturer. It may however be difficult for the regulator to fix the rate/amount of tax since the 
international price of lead varies on a daily basis. A subsidy on the safe disposal of batteries provides incentives 
to do organized-smelting. This subsidy could be a partial or complete refund of the tax paid by the manufacturer 
on batteries for complying with BMHR. For the regulator or government, this tax-subsidy scheme could be revenue 
neutral.  
The tax amount should be such that, the manufacturer would have an incentive to offer a price for battery scrap 
that would be high enough to wipe out all incentives for recycling lead in the informal sector. To the extent that the 
manufacturer is unable to buy back used batteries, the tax amount collected could be used to subsidize the use of 
clean technology in the informal sector. The presence of the unorganized sector in battery manufacturing would 
limit the impact of this policy tool.
The next two policy options target the informal sector. Our survey results show that 60% of the retailers prefer to 
sell used batteries to scrap dealers who offered a higher price and came for collection as often as every three days. 
Hence, one way to ensure that all used batteries reach manufacturers or organized smelters would be to legitimize 
the role of scrap dealers and allow the organized sector to buy battery scrap from them. Further, if unorganized 
smelters can be identified and monitored, they can be encouraged through financial assistance and tax breaks 
to adopt green technology. The resources to implement this policy tool can be raised from the penalties and tax 
suggested in the earlier policy options.
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
This study set out to understand the role of and incentives to different stakeholders in the lead recycling industry 
and how they affected the efficient functioning of the deposit refund system. The results indicate that the deposit-
refund system is well established in this industry and 90% of consumers recycle lead-acid batteries by selling them 
to battery retailers. Consumers, who obtain a net benefit of approximately Rs. 44 to 49 per kg of lead recycled, 
have a clear incentive to recycle.
7  The presence of the unorganized sector in battery manufacturing is reported to be three times the size of the organized sector (EIL, 2009).
8  There are more than 600 organized sector battery retailers listed in Delhi as per the Battery Directory and Year Book 2010 published by the 
Federation of Indian Small Scale Battery Associations (Regd.)
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However, the BMHR have not had the desired impact on the structure of the battery recycling industry and the 
informal sector continues to operate causing significant environmental pollution. Some 73% of surveyed retailers 
sold batteries to scrap dealers, who in turn sold them to informal smelters. The higher frequency of scrap dealer 
visits (almost three times a week), higher price received, storage costs, and taxes avoided motivate retailers to sell 
to the informal sector. 
For a battery manufacturer, depending on the scale of operation, collecting used batteries from retailers and 
operating smelting units can be economically viable. Thus, if manufacturers simply increased the frequency with 
which they collected batteries from retailers and bore the storage costs, they would be in compliance with BMHR. 
However, the cost of complying with the BMHR is high for registered lead smelters. They are unable to operate at 
full capacity because of a limited supply of battery scrap. This is mainly because they are currently banned from 
buying battery scrap directly from scrap dealers. 
One policy option that might improve the recycling of lead within the formal sector is a green tax and linked subsidy 
on each battery produced in the organized sector. A large enough tax per battery manufactured along with an 
equivalent subsidy if the manufacturer shows that the battery was bought back (and properly disposed), could 
provide the necessary incentives for organized smelting. Other policy options to consider are allowing the organized 
sector to buy from scrap dealers and providing assistance to unorganized smelters to ensure green recycling and 
disposal. However, the latter option would be costly to the tax payer.
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Retailer Study
Variable Obs. Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Comply 94 Retailers returning used batteries back to the 
manufacturer or not (1 if sells to manufacturer 
only, 0 otherwise)
.2659 .4442 0 1
Location 96 Location of the retailers (1 if commercial, 0 if 
residential)
.4375 .4986 0 1
Type 96 Types of retailers (1 if sells un-branded batteries 
only, 0 otherwise)
.3437 .4774 0 1
Awareness 96 Awareness about BMHR, 2001(1 if aware, 0 
otherwise)
.3541 .4807 0 1
Bought back 96 Number of used batteries bought back/100 
batteries sold
69.3750 32.51 0 95
Manufacturer 
visit
96 Frequency of visits by the manufacturer per month 2 5.3802 0 26
Scrap visit 96 Frequency of visits by the scrap dealers per month 10.2291 11.9679 0 26
Buy-back price 90 Price paid by retailers for used batteries 415.7444 28.3511 350 500
Selling price 87 Average selling price of used batteries 455.9195 34.8061 375 575
Price ratio 87 Ratio of the selling price to buy-back price 1.097999 .0737344 1 1.357
Profit 87 Difference between selling price and buy back 
price
39.54023 29.44005 0 125
Tables
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Independent Variable ‘comply’- Compliance with BMHR by Selling Used 
Batteries only to Manufacturer
Model I Model II
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Location 2.1738**
(0.033)
0.1092
(0.176)
2.2182**
(0.030)
0.1090 (0.169)
Type -4.5022***
(0.003)
-0.1745** (0.032) -4.4780***
(0.003)
-0.1683** (0.036)
Awareness 3.0978***
(0.002)
0.2181*
(0.091)
3.0978***
(0.002)
0.2125*
(0.098)
Bought back -0.0370**
(0.024)
-0.0014 (0.111) -0.0359**
(0.024)
-0.0013 (0.119)
Manufacturer visit -0.0917
(0.117)
-0.0035 (0.234) -0.0925
(0.116)
-0.0034 (0.232)
Scrap visit -0.2408***
(0.001)
-0.0091* (0.076) -0.2411***
(0.001)
-0.0088* (0.079)
Price ratio __ __ -17.9045**
(0.011)
-0.6564
(0.128)
Profit -0.0429**
(0.012)
-0.0016
(0.128)
__ __
N 87 87 87 87
Pseudo R2 0.5611 0.5628
LR chi2
Prob>chi2 
57.51
0.000
57.68
0.000
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =  
Prob > chi2 
6.46
0.5957
10.83
  0.2115
The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively
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Table 3: Illustrative Costs of setting up a smelting unit in the organized sector in NCR—an example for 
Mandir-Bhatti or Open Hearth furnace with a capacity of 5000 Mt/year
Costs Figures in Indian Rupees
Cost of Land 3,000,000 (1500 sq. yard @Rs. 2000/sq. yard)
Infrastructure Cost 4,000,000 (7500 sq. ft @ Rs. 500/sq. ft.)
Equipment Cost 1,500,000 (furnace, pollution control device)
Fuel 2,400,000 per annum
Electricity 360,000 per annum
Maintenance 30,000 per annum
Revenue
Revenue from Ash 4,800,000 per annum (200 Mt/month @Rs. 2 per kg)
Taxes on Sales
Central Sales Tax 2% if selling outside the region
Excise Tax 10.3%
VAT 5% if selling within the same region
Taxes of Raw Materials
Central Sales Tax 2% if buying from Government Organization and Private Company
Excise Tax 10.3% if buying from Private Company
Customs Duty If importing
Source: Interviews with organized smelters
Table 4: Financial Details of Chloride Metals Ltd.
General Information
(all figures in metric tons) 
Total Capacity (amount of lead smelted annually) 36000
Capacity Utilization of the Unit 16707
Amount of lead recycled from old batteries 8441
Amount of lead recycled From other sources (cables, pipes etc.) 8508
Financial Details for the year (2008-09)
(all figures in Rs. Crores)
Costs
Initial Investment/ Cost of Acquisition (For Exide)- 28
Additional Capital Cost after acquisition - 15
Cost of old Batteries 42
Cost of other sources of raw material 77
Energy Cost 5.97
Labor Cost 0.4
Revenues
Sale of recycled lead 148
Job Work 5.16
Sale of by-products 0.2
Source: Exide India Ltd—Annual Report and Interview with officials
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Table 5: Compliance Cost
Stakeholders Impacts of Compliance Cost of compliance 
Consumers •	 Discount on purchase of new battery •	 Net benefit of Rs. 44 per kg of lead(as reported by 
consumers) to Rs. 49 per kg of lead recycled (as 
reported by retailers)
Retailers •	 Difference between selling price to 
scrap dealers and manufacturers 
•	 Cost of storage and applicable taxes 
when sold to manufacturers
•	 Rs. 4 per kg of lead plus taxes
•	 Costs of storage significant
Organized Smelters •	 Low capacity utilization (shortage of 
raw materials)
•	 Pollution control devices
•	 Applicable taxes
•	 Transportation cost
•	 Smelters with an annual turnover of more than Rs. 
1.5 crore in a financial year incur : cost of pollution 
control equipment and its maintenance plus additional 
transportation cost for inputs(as shown in table 3); 
they are subject to VAT/Central Sales Tax (depending 
on the region they sell their product in), Excise duty of 
10.3% on the finished product; customs duty; central 
sales tax and excise duty on purchase of raw material 
(if they import, buy from Government organizations 
and private companies respectively) and income tax at 
the rate of at least 30%.
•	 Smelters with an annual turnover of less than Rs. 1.5 
crore only pay the central sales tax.
•	 May be economically viable if more raw material were 
available
Manufacturers •	 Cost of recycling lead or getting it 
recycled from organized smelters
•	 Collection and transportation cost
•	 Storage costs
•	 Applicable Taxes
•	 As shown in table 4
•	 Small, but could not be ascertained
•	 Could not be ascertained
•	 Could not be ascertained
•	 Overall, recycling economically viable, so costs are 
negligible
Un-organized 
Smelters
•	 Current units would need to be 
closed or fully upgraded to set up 
registered units
•	 Do not comply
•	 Costs significant as illustrated in Table 3
Employees of 
Un-organized 
smelters
•	 840 workers would lose jobs in NCR •	 Rs. 3000** per month per worker
Source: Surveys and Interviews conducted
*Excluding the storage cost and applicable taxes 
**Average income of the workers employed in un-organized smelters.
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Table 6: Policy Options and Recommendations
Policy Measure Target Group Objective Impact/Incentive/Drawback
1a. BMHR with penalty on 
manufacturer
Battery manufacturer 
in organized sector
100% buy back and safe 
disposal of batteries
Limited. Would depend on 
magnitude of penalty. Batteries 
are also manufactured in 
the informal sector and also 
imported. Monitoring agencies are 
understaffed.
1b. BMHR with penalty on 
manufacturer and importer
Manufacturers and 
Importers
100% buy back and safe 
disposal of batteries
Limited. Excludes informal sector 
and would depend on magnitude 
of penalty. Monitoring agencies are 
understaffed.
1c. BMHR with penalty on 
retailer
Retailers 100% sale of used batteries 
to manufacturer/organized 
smelter
Limited. Very large number of 
retailers. Difficult to monitor/
implement. Monitoring agencies are 
understaffed.
1d. BMHR with penalty on 
all of above.
All except consumers No used battery to reach 
informal sector
Good. Difficult/costly to implement. 
Would depend on amount of 
penalty, implementing/monitoring 
authority. Monitoring agencies are 
understaffed.
2. BMHR with green tax/
battery on manufacturer 
and importer, which is 
refundable on safe disposal
Manufacturer, 
Importer
100% buy back and safe 
disposal of batteries
Good. Would depend on the tax/
subsidy structure and won’t be 
able to account for batteries 
manufactured in the informal sector
3. BMHR with scrap dealers 
collecting for the organized 
smelters/manufacturers
Scrap dealers, 
organized smelters
100% buy back and safe 
disposal of batteries
Good. Very large numbers. Will sell 
to organized sector if they get higher 
price than unorganized sector.
4. BMHR with financial and 
technical assistance to 
informal smelters to use 
green technology (fund 
from penalty collected in 1 
and 2)
Informal smelters Green recycling and 
disposal
Good. Difficult to identify because of 
large number and location. May not 
want to be monitored and eventually 
taxed.
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics16
Figures
Figure 1: Price Trend of Lead at London Metal Exchange (US$/ton) -January 2005 to December 2010
Source: London Metal Exchange, http//www.lme.com/lead_graphs.asp
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Figure 2: Recycling Pathway of Organized Smelters 
Consumers
Retailers
Manufacturer
Registered/Organized 
Smelter
Used Batteries
(Rs. 416/-)
Used Batteries
(Rs. 455/-)
Used BatteriesRecycled Lead
New Batteries
(Rs. 4,100/-)
New Batteries
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Consumers
Retailers
Scrap dealers
Bhattis/Un-organized 
Smelters
Local Battery  
Manufacturer
Used Batteries**
(Rs. 416/-)
Used Batteries**
(Rs. 459/-)
Used Batteries
(Rs. 471.60/-)#
Total Lead recovered/battery
(Rs. 514.41/-)##Recycled Lead
New Batteries
(Rs. 4,100/-)*
New Batteries
Note:
* Price of the new car Batteries ranges from Rs. 2700/- to 5500/-, middle value of the price range (Rs. 4100/-) has been taken.
** Mean value based on survey data 
# Scrap dealers sell the used batteries to Bhattis or un-organized smelters at profit margin of Rs. 1.5/- per kg of lead present in 
the used battery. Car battery, on average, has 8.4 kg of lead (60% of the total weight of the battery of 14 kg)). Assuming a profit 
margin of Rs. 1.50 per kg, price paid by the Bhattis is Rs. 471.60/- (Rs. 459 + 12.60/-). Whereas unorganized smelters buy 
the batteries by weight at 55% of the LME price of lead. Buying price of Rs. 471.60/- means the LME price would be around Rs. 
61.24 per kg. 
## Lead recovered from a single battery is about 60% of the total weight of the car battery. (Lead recovered multiplied by the LME 
price (Rs. 61.24/-) gives the price of the total lead recovered from one battery by the unorganized smelters as Rs. 514.41/-.
(These calculations are based on interviews with scrap dealers and other informal sector agents. Figures are representative of 
the prices existing on the day of survey. The prices vary on daily basis.) 
Figure: 3 Recycling Pathway of Un-organized Smelters 
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Figure 4: Structure of Lead Acid Battery Recycling Industry in Delhi
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Used Batteries
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Figure 5: Locations of the Retailers Surveyed
Location Code
No. of 
retailers Location Code
No. of 
retailers
TisHazari S1 04 KailashColony S14 02
Mori Gate S2 01 East Azad Nagar S15 01
Ghokhle Market S3 09 Vaishali S16 02
Karol Bagh S4 08 Vasundhra S17 02
Kotla S5 06 Pandav Nagar S18 01
Jhandewalan S6
04 East Krishna 
Nagar S19
04
PalikaBhavan S7 07 VikashMarg S20 02
SarojniNagar S8 03 MayurVihar S21 05
Defence Colony S9 01 Badarpur S22 01
Shanker Market S10 02 Dwarka S23 05
Mayapuri S11 04 Uttam Nagar S24 01
Hari Nagar S12 01 Gurgaon S25 04
RajouriGarden S13 01 Shahadra S26 01
Note: Sampling was done in the urban areas which had clusters of battery retailers. 
North and South west parts of Delhi are predominantly rural with agricultural land 
use and not many battery retailers.
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Appendix I: Questionnaire for Consumers 
1.  Place of residence ____________________________________________________________________
2.  What car do you drive? ________________________________________________________________ 
3.   Which type of car battery do you prefer? 
  National brand Please specify name ______________________________________________ 
  Local brand 
 Why? ______________________________________________________________________________
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
4.  If you prefer locally manufactured battery, then where do you buy it from? _________________________
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
5.  What is the price which you pay for a new battery? 
  Rs. 1000- Rs. 1500 
  Rs. 1501- Rs, 2000 
  Rs. 2001- Rs. 2500 
  Rs. 2501- Rs. 3000 
  Rs. 3001- Rs. 3500 
  Rs. 3501- Rs. 4000 
6.  Are you aware of the buyback system (Deposit Refund System) for batteries? 
  Yes 
   No 
7.  Do you exchange your old battery for a new one? 
  Yes 
   No 
8.  If yes, then how much discount did you get for a new battery when you returned the old one? __________
 __________________________________________________________________________________
9.  If no, then for what purpose do you use the old battery? _______________________________________
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix II: Questionnaire for Retailers
1.  Are you an authorized or a general dealer of batteries? 
  Authorized 
  General 
  Both
2.  If you are an authorized dealer, then which brand(s) of batteries do you sell? _______________________
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
3.  If you are a general dealer, then which brands of batteries (both local and national) do you sell? ________
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
4.  Are you aware of the Batteries (Management and Handling) Rules, 2001 (BMHR)? 
  Yes 
  No 
5.  How many batteries are you able to buy back, in say one week, as compared to the number of batteries sold? 
  51%- 60% 
  61%- 70% 
  71%- 80% 
  81%- 90% 
  91%- 100% 
6.  How much do you pay customers for their used batteries? _______________________________________ 
7.  To whom do you sell the used batteries which you buy back from customers? _________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
8.  If batteries are sold to scrap dealers, then why don’t you sell the used batteries to companies? ___________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
9.  For how much do you sell the used batteries? _________________________________________________
10.  What is the frequency of collection of used batteries by companies (per week)? _______________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
11.  What is the frequency of collection of used batteries by scrap dealers (per week)? _____________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________
12.  Does a company buy back its own brand only or other local and national brands too? 
  Only its own brand 
  Other brands too 
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13.  Is there a difference between the prices you pay for used batteries of local and national brands? 
  Yes 
  No 
 If yes, then what is the difference? __________________________________________________________
14.  Is there a difference between the prices you receive for used batteries of local and national brands from 
scrap dealers? 
  Yes 
  No 
 If yes, then what is the difference? __________________________________________________________
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